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Abstract
We consider a class of law invariant utilities which contains the Rank
Dependent Expected Utility (RDU) and the cumulative prospect theory
(CPT). We show that the computation of demand for a contingent claim
when utilities are within that class, although not as simple as in the
Expected Utility (EU) case, is still tractable. Speciﬁc attention is given
to the RDU and to the CPT cases. Numerous examples are fully solved.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C0, D8.
Keywords: demand, law invariant utilities, quantiles, constrained optimiza-
tion.
1 Introduction




V (X) : X ≥ 0; E(ψX) ≤ w
o
(1)
where V is a monotone law invariant utility. In (1), X is a random variable on
a non atomic space with cumulative distribution function FX and ψ a pricing
density with a continuous distribution function Fψ. This problem may be given
several interpretations. In the ﬁrst, there are two periods 1 and 2. At date 1,
there is uncertainty about which state of the world will prevail at date 2. An
agent endowed with wealth w and whose preferences over period 2 outcomes are
represented by the utility function V buys in period 1 nonnegative contingent
claims for period 2 at price ψ. She maximizes the utility of future outcomes
subject to the constraint that expenditure should not be larger than w. In the
second, consider a complete ﬁnancial market in continuous time, as in chapter
3 of Karatsas and Shreve [16]. Let the ﬁltered space be (Ω,F,P,Ft), 0 ≤ t ≤ T
and H be the state price density process, in other words, the discounted Radon
Nikodym derivative process of the unique martingale measure with respect to
P and set ψ = H(T). An agent with initial wealth w, invests in self-ﬁnancing
portfolio processess with non negative associated wealth process so as to max-
imize a utility V that only depends on her terminal wealth. Since the market
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1is complete, an FT measurable non negative random variable X is the terminal
wealth associated to a portfolio process if and only if E(ψX) = w. The agent is
thus brought down to solving a problem of type (1). Problems of type (1) also
appear in statistical test theory (see Schied [20] and the references therein).
Since V is law-invariant, one can write V (X) = v(F
−1
X ) where F
−1
X is a
version of the inverse of FX or quantile of X. Using Hardy-Littlewood inequality
(see [10], [5]), our ﬁrst result is that, without loss of generality, one may restrict
attention to claims that are nonincreasing functions of the price ψ and that the












X (t)dt ≤ w
o
(2)
where q(t) := F
−1
ψ (1 − t). The proof of this result only relies on the mono-
tonicity of V and does not require its concavity. We recall that, if V is weakly
upper-semicontinuous, the concavity of V is equivalent to V being second or-
der stochastic dominance preserving, an assumption made in Carlier and Dana
[6],[3] and in Schied [20] in previous related work. Hence the reformulation as
a quantile demand problem only requires that V is compatible with ﬁrst-order
stochastic dominance and not necessarily with second-order stochastic domi-
nance.
We further assume that utilities are additively separable with respect to the











X (0)) accounts for a speciﬁc weight given to the minimal value
of X. The techniques of the paper can also be used to handle a term of the
form h(F
−1
X (1)) i.e. a speciﬁc weight given to the maximal value of X. For
simplicity, we omit such a term in the sequel. Utility functions of type (3) were
ﬁrst introduced by Green and Jullien [11], in the case g = 0. In Epstein and
Chew [7], these utilities are called Rank linear utilities (RLU from now on).
Axiomatic foundations for (3) were given by Green and Jullien [11], Epstein
and Chew [7] and Chew and Wakker [9]. Two popular examples in behavioral
economics and ﬁnance of utilities in the class (3) are the Rank Dependent Ex-
pected Utility (RDU) and Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT). Indeed, for an
increasing continuous utility index u : R → R, an RDU is the Choquet integral
of u(X) with respect to a distortion f : [0,1] → [0,1]. When f is continuously







and is a special case of (3) corresponding to g = 0 and L(t,x) = f0(1 − t)u(x).
If f is continuously diﬀerentiable on [0,1) and discontinuous at 1, one has








which deﬁnes a utility of the type (3) with L(t,x) = f0(1 − t)u(x) and g(x) =
(1 − f(1−))u(x) (with f(1−) = limx↑1 f(x)). When u(x) = x in formula (5),
2one obtains Yaari’s utilities. One recovers the CPT by taking
L(t,x) = f0
1(1 − t)u1((x − x0)+) − f0
2(t)u2((x − x0)−)
with x+ := max(x,0), x− = max(−x,0), f1, f2 two distortions, u1, u2 two
increasing utility indices fulﬁlling u1(0) = u2(0) = 0 deﬁned on R+, x0 ∈ R+ a
reference point and g = 0 in (3). It is usually assumed that investors are risk
averse for consumptions above x0 (u1 concave) and risk-takers for consumptions
below x0 (u2 convex). In the paper, we will pay special attention to the case
L(t,x) := f0(1 − t)u(x) where u is convex on [0,x0] and concave on [x0,∞).
The RDU has received a lot of attention in decision theory and it is well-
known that it accounts for a number of violations of Expected Utility such as
Allais’ paradox. Its axiomatic aspects have extensively been discussed. Neces-
sary and suﬃcient conditions for RDU to be second order stochastic dominance
(SSD from now on) preserving are well known (see [8]) and equivalent to its
concavity as functional over random variables. Technical isues as diﬀerentiabil-
ity of RDU as functional over lotteries (see for example Chew et al. [8] or Wang
[23] and the bibliographies listed therein) or over random variables (see Carlier
and Dana [4]) are also well understood. However, RDU has not been much used
for problems of economics of uncertainty in particular for inﬁnite state spaces
except in the recent mathematical ﬁnance literature on risk measures (see for
example Schied [20] and Jouini et al [14] and Carlier and Dana [3]). This is due
to the technical diﬃculty of solving maximization problems for such utilities.
The axiomatic aspects of prospect theory and cumulative prospect theory
(see [15], [22]) have also been extensively discussed with emphasis on experi-
ments. Loss aversion, the risk seeking behavior of investors for potential losses
and the distortions of probabilities have been analysed in a number of ﬁnan-
cial models. However prospect theory and cumulative prospect theory have not
been used in portfolio theory for inﬁnite state spaces until the recent papers
of Berkelaar et al [2] and Jin and Zhou [13]. Berkelaar et al [2] consider the
EU contingent consumption demand problem for the convex-concave utility in-
dex introduced by Kahneman-Tverski [22] while Jin and Zhou [13] considers a
general CPT contingent claim demand problem with short-selling.
The quantile of a random variable being a nondecreasing function, when
utility is of the form (3), the quantile demand problem is a variational problem
subject to a monotonicity constraint. Calculus of variations problems with con-
cave criteria and monotonicity constraints have appeared in several contexts in
economics. They were ﬁrst used in one dimensional adverse selection theory
(see for example, Mirrlees [17], Mussa-Rosen [18], Spence [21], Guesnerie-Laﬀont
[12], Rochet [19]). Bank and Riedel [1] also dealt with such problems to solve in-
tertemporal utility maximization problems. In particular, Mussa and Rosen [18]
developed a method called the ironing procedure to characterize solutions. They
showed that there is a partition of the type space consisting of: sub-intervals on
which the solution is constant (such intervals are called bunches), sub-intervals
on which the solution is increasing and coincides with the maximizer without
the monotonicity constraint.
Building on the previous techniques, an existence proof and a characteri-
zation of the solution to the quantile demand problem is provided in [6] when
L(t,.) is strictly concave, increasing. The ﬁrst contribution of this paper is
3to provide conditions for existence of a solution that are far more general
than in [6] by relaxing the assumption that L(t,.) is concave. The second
is to discuss the speciﬁc cases of the RDU and CPT. In the RDU case, the
assumption that L(t,.) is strictly concave increasing is equivalent to assum-
ing that u is strictly concave increasing, f being unrestricted. It is therefore
not fulﬁlled for standard assumptions on the CPT (in particular in the case
f1 = f2, u1(x) = u(x + x0), u2(x) = −u(−x + x0) and u convex-concave).
It is neither fulﬁlled for u linear, the case studied by Schied [20]. Focusing
on the special case of a convex-concave utility (although the method may be
generalized to utility indices that are piecewise concave or convex as Friedman-
Savage’s concave convex concave utility), we ﬁrst prove existence of an optimal
solution. Then, as Jin and Zhou [13], we show that the restriction of an optimal
solution to values below the reference point is the solution of a convex maxi-
mization problem subject to a monotonicity constraint and the constraint that
consumptions are below the reference point. Its solution is obtained as in Schied
[20] by characterizing the extreme points of the set of non-decreasing functions
that fulﬁll the budget constraint and take values in a given interval. We show
that, below the reference point, the demand takes at most three values which
thus means that either it is totally insensitive to prices or that small changes of
prices lead to jumps in the demand. We then show that the restriction of an op-
timal solution to values above the reference point is the solution of an auxilliary
concave maximization problem for an RDU with strictly concave utility index
subject to a monotonicity constraint and the constraint that consumptions are
above the reference point. In contrast, the demand is continuous with decreas-
ing and constant pieces. This result is obtained from a separate and detailed
study of the portfolio’s problem in the case of a RDU with u strictly concave.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, some classical deﬁnitions and
results are recalled and the demand problem for an agent with a law invariant
monotone utility is brought down to a quantile demand problem. Section 3 deals
with existence and characterizes solutions when the utility is of type (3) and
strictly concave in the quantile. Section 4 specializes on the RDU case. Section
5 is devoted to CPT. Finally, section 6 provides numerous examples. We obtain
closed-form solutions for both RDU and RLU concave cases. An RDU example
shows that the demand may be constant on an arbitrary number of intervals.
A pair of examples considers distortions which are neither concave nor convex.
A ﬁnal example suggests that the RLU model allows richer income eﬀects than
the RDU does.
2 Reformulation of demand problems
2.1 Preliminaries
Given as primitive is a probability space (Ω,B,P). Let X be a random vari-
able and let FX(t) = P(X ≤ t), t ∈ R denote its distribution function. The
generalized inverse of FX is deﬁned by:
F
−1
X (0) = essinf X and F
−1
X (t) = inf{z ∈ R : FX(z) ≥ t}, for all t ∈ (0,1]
The fact that two random variables X on (Ω,B,P) and Y on (Ω0,B0,P0)
have the same probability law will be denoted X
d ∼ Y .
4Deﬁnition 1 A utility function V : L∞(Ω) → R ∪ {−∞} is called
1. (strictly) monotone if X ≥ Y a.e. implies V (X) ≥ V (Y ) (resp. V (X) >
V (Y ) whenever X ≥ Y a.e. and P(X 6= Y ) > 0),
2. law invariant if V (X) = V (Y ) whenever X
d ∼ Y .
In the remainder of the paper, we shall assume that (Ω,B,P) is non-atomic,
that is, there exists a random variable U on (Ω,B,P) uniformly distributed on
[0,1] (we refer to [10] for other equivalent deﬁnitions). We shall in the sequel
say that a random variable Y on (Ω,B,P) is non-atomic if FY is continuous
(equivalently F
−1
Y is increasing or FY (Y ) is uniformly distributed).
To reformulate demand problems in terms of quantiles only, we shall use









Y (1 − t)dt. (6)
Moreover, if Y is nonatomic, the inequality is strict unless X = F
−1
X (1−FY (Y )).
Example : Choquet integral with respect to a distortion and RDU.
A distortion is a nondecreasing function f : [0,1] → [0,1], such that f(0) = 0,
f(1) = 1. We assume here that f is absolutely continuous on [0,1) with a
possible discontinuity at 1, in the sense that there exists a nonnegative L1








Note that f is discontinuous at 1 if and only if f(1−) =
R 1
0 k < f(1) = 1. Slightly
abusing notations, we shall simply write f0 = k. Let X ∈ L∞(Ω,B,P). Since
X is bounded, we may without loss of generality assume that X is nonnegative.
































Since s < 1 − FX(t) is equivalent to t < F
−1








X (1 − s) − F
−1
X (0))ds








5The previous formula extends to every X ∈ L∞(Ω,B,P). If u is a utility index
R+ → R, we then obtain the RDU utility:








Therefore a RDU is a utility of type (3) with L(t,x) = f0(1−t)u(x) and g(x) =
(1 − f(1−))u(x).
Example : The CPT utility. A CPT utility for X ∈ L∞(Ω,B,P) non-
negative is deﬁned by
V (X) = Ef1(u1(X − x0)+) − Ef2(u2(X − x0)−)
where f1 and f2 are two absolutely continuous distortions on [0,1] and ui : R+ →
R, i = 1,2 are two increasing continuous utility indices fulﬁlling ui(0) = 0 and






















X (t) − x0)−)dt
A CPT utility is therefore a utility of type (3) with
L(t,x) = f0
1(1 − t)u1((x − x0)+) − f0
2(t)u2((x − x0)−)
Assume further that u : R+ → R+ is concave continuous and increasing with
u(x0) = 0 and let u1(x) = u(x + x0) and u2(x) = −u(−x + x0). Then u1 is
concave continuous and increasing and u2 convex continuous and increasing.
We have u1((x − x0)+) = u(x)χx≥x0 and u2((x − x0)−) = −u(x)χx≤x0 where



















1(1 − t) = f0






X (t))dt with a convex-concave utility index.
2.2 Reformulation as a quantile demand problem
Let L∞
+ (Ω) be the set of bounded state contingent consumptions. Let ψ ∈
L1
+(Ω) with E(ψ) = 1 be a pricing density. Consider an agent with utility
V : L∞(Ω) → R and income w > 0. The agent’s demand for state contingent
claims is determined by the maximization problem :
(D) sup{V (X) : E(ψX) ≤ w, X ∈ L∞
+ (Ω)}. (7)
Let us assume that ψ is nonatomic (so that that Fψ(ψ) is uniformly distributed).
We further assume that V is strictly monotone and law-invariant and set
A := {x : (0,1) → R+, x nondecreasing}
Let U be a uniformly distributed random variable on (Ω,B,P) and let us
deﬁne v(x) := V (x ◦ U) for x ∈ A. Since V is law invariant, v does not depend
on the choice of U and by construction V (X) = v(F
−1
X ) for all X. Intuition
suggests that the demand problem may be restricted to the class of nonincreasing
function of the price i.e. to claims of the form X = x(1 − Fψ(ψ)) with x ∈ A.
The result is formally proven in the next lemma.
6Lemma 1 Let X be admissible for the demand problem (D), then there exists
Y admissible for (D) which is a nonincreasing function of ψ such that V (Y ) ≥
V (X). Moreover, the inequality is strict unless X = F
−1
X (1 − Fψ(ψ)).
Proof. If X = F
−1
X (1 − Fψ(ψ)), there is nothing to prove. Let us therefore
assume X 6= Z := F
−1
X (1 − Fψ(ψ)) (note that Z := F
−1
Z (1 − Fψ(ψ)) since
Z
d ∼ X). Using Hardy-Littlewood inequality (6), we have E(ψZ) < E(ψX) and
since V is law invariant V (Z) = V (X). Deﬁne then β := w − E(ψZ) > 0 and
Y := β + Z. By construction Y is admissible, nonincreasing in ψ and Y ≥ Z
with Y 6= Z. Since V is strictly monotone, we then have V (Y ) > V (Z) = V (X).
Let us deﬁne q(t) := F
−1
ψ (1−t), and remark that q is decreasing and nonneg-
ative. The demand problem (D) may be brought down to a quantile problem:
Proposition 1 X is a solution of (D) iﬀ X = x(1−Fψ(ψ)) and x is a solution
of :




Proof. Let us assume that X is a solution of (D) and deﬁne x := F
−1
X then
by lemma 1, necessarily X = x(1 − Fψ(ψ)). Let x be admissible for ( ˜ D), then
x(1 − Fψ(ψ)) is admissible for (D). We then have V (X) = v(x) ≥ V (x(1 −
Fψ(ψ)) = v(x). Hence x solves ( ˜ D).
Conversely assume that x solves ( ˜ D) and deﬁne X = x(1 − Fψ(ψ)). Let X
be admissible for (D). By lemma 1, there exists x admissible for ( ˜ D) such that
V (x(1 − Fψ(ψ))) = v(x) ≥ V (X). Since V (X) = v(x) ≥ v(x) ≥ V (X), we get
the desired result.
In proposition 1, we only required V to be strictly monotone and law in-
variant. Note that proposition 1 shows the equivalence between the abstract
demand problem (D) and its quantile reformulation ( ˜ D). In itself, it does not
show the existence of a solution to the demand problem. Note that we require
x to be bounded and existence of a bounded solution is a non trivial issue in
general. Nevertheless, proposition 1 implies that (D) admits solutions as soon
as ( ˜ D) does. When V is of type (3), ( ˜ D) is a variational problem subject to a
monotonicity constraint. Under additional assumptions, existence will be ob-
tained in the next section.
3 Existence and characterization of solutions
3.1 Existence













L(t,x(t))dt + g(x(0)) (8)




L(t,x(t))dt + g(x(0)) : x ∈ A ∩ L∞,
Z 1
0
qx ≤ w}. (9)
To prove existence of a solution to (9), we will ﬁrst relax the requirement
that x is bounded into x ∈ L1(q) (i.e. xq ∈ L1) and then give suﬃcient solutions
that guarantee that L1(q) solutions are in fact bounded. Let us then consider




L(t,x(t))dt + g(x(0)) : x ∈ A ∩ L1(q),
Z 1
0
qx ≤ w}. (10)
Assuming that q > 0 on (0,1), let us remark that from the monotonicity of x,
if x is admissible for (10), the budget constraint gives the bound




∀t ∈ (0,1). (11)
Let us now consider the following assumptions:
1. L ∈ C0((0,1) × R+,R), g ∈ C0(R+,R), g is increasing on R+ and L(t,.)
is increasing on R+ for every t ∈ (0,1)
2. q is decreasing, q ∈ L1 and q > 0 on (0,1),
3. deﬁning y as in (11), the function t 7→ L(t,y(t)) is L1,
4. for every β > 0 and t0 ∈ (0,1), there exists α > 0 such that for every
t ∈ [0,t0] and every (x,y) ∈ [0,β]2 such that y ≥ x one has L(t,y) −
L(t,x) ≥ α(y − x),
5. there exists x0 ≥ 0 and δ0 ∈ (0,1) such that L(t,.) is concave and diﬀer-
entiable on [x0,+∞) for every t ∈ [δ0,1), and
∂xL(t,x)
q(t)
→ 0, as (t,x) → (1,+∞). (12)
The continuity assumption may be weakened to measurability of L with re-
spect to t and upper semi-continuity with respect to x. This extension covers
in particular the CPT case as well as logarithmic utilities. The monotonicity
assumptions (compatibility with ﬁrst order stochastic dominance) are standard
and imply that one can replace the inequality by an equality in the budget con-
straint in (9). Assumption 2, is satisﬁed in the case where prices are distributed
according to a log-normal distribution, note also that q ∈ L1 if and only if ψ is
L1 and q is decreasing if and only if ψ is nonatomic. Assumption 3 combined
with the monotonicity part of assumption 1 ensures that the value of (10) is








is integrable in a neighbourhood of 0.
8To ﬁx ideas, let us consider the case where f0(t) ≤ Atα−1, F
−1
ψ (t) ≥ Btθ for
positive constants A and B and small t, and u(x) = xβ, then the previous
condition is satisﬁed as soon as (θ + 1)β < α. Let us remark that when prices
are log-normally distributed, for any θ > 0, the inequality F
−1
ψ (t) ≥ Btθ holds
for small t. Assumption 4 is veriﬁed if L(t,.) is C1 or piecewise C1 and ∂xL
is bounded from below by a positive constant on [0,t0] × [0,β]. In the RDU
case, condition (12) in assumption 5 is satisﬁed as soon as u (which is concave
on [x0,+∞)) satisﬁes the Inada condition u0(+∞) = 0 and f0/F
−1
ψ remains
bounded in a neighbourhood of 0. Note that the latter condition is always true
if f is Lipschitz and prices are bounded from below by a positive constant (i.e.
F
−1
ψ (0) > 0) but requires in particular that f0(0) = 0 if F
−1
ψ (0) = 0. Note that
(12) also holds whenever (f0/F
−1
ψ )(0+) = 0.
Theorem 1 Under assumptions 1, 2, 3, above, (10) possess solutions. If, in
addition, we further assume that 4 and 5 hold every solution of (10) is in L∞
which implies in particular that (9) possesses solutions.
When g and L(t,.) are strictly concave, (9) admits a unique solution x.
Whether this solution is continuous or Lipschitz continuous is a natural question.
Indeed, if x is Lipschitz, by Rademacher’s theorem, it is diﬀerentiable a.e. and
in that case one may replace the global constraint ”x nondecreasing” by the
local one ˙ x ≥ 0. We refer to [6] for continuity and Lipschitz continuity results.
3.2 Characterization of solutions in the concave case
If L is concave increasing in its second argument and g is concave increasing,
then, by standard arguments, we see that x solves (9) if and only if there exists










and xλ satisﬁes the budget constraint
R 1
0 qxλ = w. For a ﬁxed λ, program (13)
is a variational problem subject to a monotonicity constraint. Problems with
a similar mathematical structure have been studied in the theory of incentives
(see [17], [18], [19]) .
Throughout this subsection, in addition to assumptions 1 − 5 of subsection
3.1, we assume the following:
• for every t ∈ (0,1), L(t,.) is diﬀerentiable on R∗
+ := (0,+∞) and ∂xL ∈
C0((0,1) × R∗
+,R), g ∈ C1(R∗
+,R),
• for every t ∈ (0,1), L(t,.) is strictly concave increasing on R∗
+, g is strictly
concave increasing on R∗
+,
• q is continuous on (0,1), q > 0 on (0,1) and q ∈ L1,
• deﬁning ˜ xλ as the pointwise maximizer in (13)
˜ xλ(t) := argmaxx∈R+(L(t,x) − λq(t)x).
˜ xλ is locally Lipschitz continuous on (0,1),
9• either:
lim







∂xL(t,ε)dt = +∞, ∀δ ∈ (0,1). (15)
These assumptions ensure the existence and uniqueness of a continuous solution
to (9) and (13) for every λ > 0. Strict concavity of L(t,.) is necessary to obtain
the continuity of the solution: Schied [20] obtains discontinuous solutions in the
linear case. In the RDU case, the strict concavity assumption amounts to that
of u and is violated in the CPT case. Under the fourth assumption above, the
solutions are locally Lipschitz, hence diﬀerentiable a.e.. When g = 0, the last
assumption simpliﬁes to (15), an Inada condition weaker than the assumption
∂xL(t,0+) = +∞ for all t that might seem more natural. In subsection 6.3, we
discuss the case L(t,x) := ln(t+x) which satisﬁes (15) and ∂xL(t,0+) = t−1 ∈ R,
for every t > 0. In the RDU case, L(t,x) = f0(1 − t)u(x), and (15) simpliﬁes
to the usual Inada condition u0(0+) = +∞. Conditions (14) or (15) ensure that
solutions to (9) and (13) remain positive.
To solve the demand problem (9), in practice, one proceeds in two steps :
for a given λ, the solution xλ of (13) is ﬁrst computed by using proposition 2
below, then λ is determined from the budget constraint. The characterization
of the solution xλ of (13) is given by the following:
Proposition 2 Let λ > 0 and x ∈ A ∩ L∞ and let Λ be deﬁned for every
t ∈ [0,1] by:
Λ0(t) := ∂xL(t,x(t)) − λq(t) and Λ(1) = 0 (16)
then x = xλ if and only if x is diﬀerentiable a.e. and:
(i) Λ ≥ 0, and Λ(t)x0(t) = 0 a.e.,
(ii) x(0) > 0 and Λ(0) = g0(x(0)).
A detailed proof of proposition 2 may be found in [6]. Condition (i) is
the usual complementary slackness condition associated to the monotonicity
constraint : it means that a.e. either Λ(t) = 0 or xλ
0(t) = 0. Let us remark
that when t ∈ (0,1) and Λ(t) = 0 = minΛ, then Λ0(t) = 0 which implies
xλ(t) = ˜ xλ(t). The optimality condition (i), then implies the simpler condition:
xλ
0(t) 6= 0 ⇒ xλ(t) = ˜ xλ(t). (17)
If g = 0, we deduce from proposition 2 that if ˜ xλ is decreasing, then xλ
coincides with ˜ xλ at, at most one point, hence optimality condition (i) implies
that xλ is constant. In the polar case where ˜ xλ is nondecreasing, then xλ = ˜ xλ.
When ˜ xλ is not monotone, ﬁnding the solution is more intricate. It ﬁrst follows
from proposition 2, that either xλ is constant or xλ = ˜ xλ (the latter case can
only occur on intervals where ˜ xλ is itself nondecreasing). Furthermore, the
function Λ deﬁned by (16) must remain nonnegative and Λ = 0 on intervals on
which xλ = ˜ xλ. By concavity of L(t,.), Λ is nondecreasing whenever the graph
of xλ is below that of ˜ xλ and nonincreasing otherwise.
104 The concave RDU demand problem
The RDU demand problem, with a continuous distortion corresponds to the
case L(t,x) = f0(1 − t)u(x) where we assume that f is a continuous increasing
distortion on [0,1], f is C1 on (0,1) and u is strictly concave increasing and C1
on R∗
+ := (0,+∞). In the case of a discontinuous distortion, we take L(t,x) =
(1−ε)f0(1−t)u(x) and g(x) = εu(x), under the same assumptions on u and f.
Throughout this section, we will further always assume that the quantile of the
pricing density F
−1
ψ is such that the assumptions of subsections 3.1 and 3.2 are
fulﬁlled.
Referring to f00/f0 as an ambiguity index, we will see that if the agent has an
high ambiguity index, then her optimal consumption is constant. We will also
show that an RDU agent behaves almost as if she was perceiving a perturbation
of the pricing density and was an EU agent. The perceived pricing density
depends only on the distortion and on the pricing density. The probability
perception function f and the utility u on outcomes have therefore separate
eﬀects on demand. The distortion f determines the perceived pricing density
while u determines demand as a function of the perceived pricing density. The
previous analysis extends to the case of convex distortions discontinuous at 1.
Aversion to the worse outcome induces the demand to be constant for high
values of the pricing density. The agent thus insures herself a minimal amount.
4.1 The case of a continuous distortion
The RDU demand problem, with a continuous distortion and ﬁxed multiplier






(f0(1 − t)u(x(t)) − λq(t)x(t))dt. (18)
Assuming u0(0+) = +∞, u0(+∞) = 0, let I : (0,+∞) → (0,+∞) denote the
inverse of u0. The function ˜ xλ that maximizes pointwise the integrand in (18)
is given by:













Note that ˜ xλ has the same monotonicity as the ratio f0(1 − t)/F
−1
ψ (1 − t)
(independently of λ). If this ratio is increasing, xλ = ˜ xλ. Conversely, since either
xλ
0(t) = 0 or xλ(t) = ˜ xλ(t), xλ is increasing (meaning that the demand function
is decreasing) if and only if F
−1
ψ /f0 is increasing. As a direct consequence we
have:
Proposition 3 The demand of a RDU agent with a continuous distortion is
decreasing in the price if and only if F
−1
ψ /f0 is increasing. Hence, if F
−1
ψ /f0 is
not increasing, there are ranges of values of the pricing density for which the
demand is constant. If F
−1
ψ /f0 is nonincreasing, the demand is constant.
If the distortion is concave, then the demand is decreasing. In other words,
the strict monotonicity of the demand, well-known in the EU case, extends to
the RDU when agents are optimistic. The condition F
−1
ψ /f0 increasing means
that F
−1
ψ grows faster than f0 and is equivalent to the ambiguity index f00/f0











ψ /f0 is not monotone, the demand function has some ﬂat zones
and the computation of xλ is more involved. It can be achieved as follows. We




is independent of the multiplier λ. Indeed, the optimality conditions may be







(f0(1 − s)hλ(s) − q(s))ds. (20)
Hence hλ is characterized by the conditions:
Z t
0





(f0(1 − s)hλ − q) = 0 a.e. and
Z 1
0
(f0(1 − s)hλ − q) = 0. (22)
Since these conditions do not depend on λ and deﬁne hλ in a unique way by
proposition 2, hλ is independent of λ hence will simply be denoted h. Once h
is determined, xλ is given by xλ = I(λh). The multiplier λ > 0 is determined






I(λh(s))q(s)ds = w. (23)
Denoting by λ∗ the root of (23) (existence and uniqueness follows from the
strict monotonicity of I and I(0) = ∞, I(∞) = 0), the optimal x is given by
x = I(λ∗h).
To sum up, the demand X can be computed as follows:
• determine h by the conditions (21) and (22),
• determine λ = λ∗ by solving (23) ,
• the demand (as a function of the price ψ) is then given by
X(ψ) = I(λ∗H(ψ)) with : H(ψ) := h(1 − Fψ(ψ)). (24)
Let us compute (24) for the case of CRRA utility indices. Assume ﬁrst that
























12In the EU case, x = w
q and X = w
ψ.
Assume next that u(x) = x
1−γ























while in the EU case, x = w
q1/γ
1 R 1




In practice, only the determination of h may be complicated. Let us remark
though that there is a partition of (0,1) consisting of subintervals on which h is
constant and subintervals on which h(t) = F
−1
ψ (1 − t)/f0(1 − t). We emphasize
that h does not depend on the utility index u (only λ∗ does). If we consider
the EU case (f(t) = t) as a benchmark, it is easy to interpret formula (24)
as a deformation of the EU demand. Indeed, in the EU case, one has h = q
and the demand is given by X(ψ) = I (λ∗ψ) for some λ∗ > 0. Comparing the
previous EU formula with (24) : X(ψ) = I(λ∗H(ψ)) = I(λ∗h(1 − Fψ(ψ))), we
may interpret H(ψ) (which typically exhibits ﬂat segments) as perceived prices.
The demand of an RDU agent is almost (the value of the multiplier need not
be the same) the same as if she was EU facing the perceived price H(ψ). Let
us point out that in general the perceived price is an atomic random variable
which does not depend on the revenue w. Let us ﬁnally remark that, for ﬁxed
utility index, price distribution and distortion, λ∗ (which is determined almost
as for an EU model) is a decreasing function of revenue w. Hence the occurrence
and the location of bunches or intervals of inelasticity of demand do not depend
neither on w nor on u. They only depend on ψ and f. Furthermore income
only aﬀects the size of demand but not its shape.

















then there is an interval of prices on which the demand is constant:
Proposition 4 If (25) holds, the demand is constant for low prices. If (26)
holds, the demand is constant for high prices.











ψ (1 − s) − f0(1 − s)h(s))ds
hence Λ(t) > 0 and x0(t) = 0 for t close to 1. Thus, the demand is constant for
low prices. If (26) hold, one obtains in a similar way Λ(t) > 0 for small t : the
demand is constant for high prices.
If both (25) and (26) hold, the demand is strangled, a phenomenon that can
not be modelled by expected utilities with diﬀerentiable utility indices. Let us
remark that if F
−1
ψ (0) > 0 then (25) amounts to f0(0) = 0, and if F
−1
ψ (1) < +∞
(i.e. prices are bounded) (26) amounts to f0(1) = +∞.
134.2 RDU with discontinuous distortion
In this section, we extend the previous analysis to the case of discontinuous
distortions as introduced in section 2.1. The RDU demand problem, with a
discontinuous distortion and ﬁxed multiplier λ > 0 reads as:
sup
x∈A
vλ(x) := εu(x(0)) + (1 − ε)
Z 1
0
(f0(1 − t)u(x(t)) − λq(t)x(t))dt (27)
with f diﬀerentiable and ε > 0. Let us deﬁne:
˜ xλ(t) = I

λq(t)






ψ (1 − t)
f0(1 − t)(1 − ε)
!
. (28)






The optimality conditions may be expressed in terms of the hε,λ. First deﬁne:
Λ(t)
λ
= εhε,λ(0) + (1 − ε)
Z t
0
(f0(1 − s)hε,λ − q).
Then the optimality conditions read as:
εhε,λ(0) + (1 − ε)
Z t
0
(f0(1 − s)hε,λ − q) ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ [0,1] , (29)




εhε,λ(0) + (1 − ε)
Z t
0
(f0(1 − s)hε,λ − q)

= 0, (30)
εhε,λ(0) + (1 − ε)
Z 1
0
(f0(1 − s)hε,λ − q) = 0. (31)
Since these conditions do not depend on λ and deﬁne hε,λ in a unique way as
previously, hε,λ is independent of λ and will simply be denoted hε. As in the
continuous case, the optimal solution x and the associated multiplier λ∗ > 0 are
determined by the budget constraint.
Since Λ(t) > 0 for small t > 0 (and this holds for any f0 and F
−1
ψ ), hε is
constant and so is x for small values of t. In other words, for any distortion,
utility index and distribution of prices, when ε > 0, the demand is insensitive
to price variations for prices high enough:
Proposition 5 The demand of an RDU agent with a discontinuous distortion
is constant for high values of the pricing density. If furthermore (25) holds,
then the demand is also constant for low values of the pricing density.
As in the continuous case, the optimal solution x and the associated multi-
plier λ∗ > 0 are determined by the budget constraint. We therefore have the
following expression of the demand:
X(ψ) = I(λ∗Hε(ψ)) with Hε(ψ) := hε(1 − Fψ(ψ)). (32)
14and λ = λ∗ is the root of
R 1
0 I(λhε)q = w.
When F
−1
ψ /f0 is nonincreasing as in proposition 3 the demand is constant.
In the polar case where F
−1
ψ /f0 is increasing, it is no longer true that the demand
is decreasing in the price:
Proposition 6 If F
−1
ψ /f0 is nonincreasing, the demand is constant. If F
−1
ψ /f0















Hence the demand is decreasing for prices smaller than F
−1
ψ (1 − t1) and then
constant for prices larger than F
−1
ψ (1 − t1).
To summarize the results of this section, as is well-known, the demand of an
EU agent with a concave diﬀerentiable utility index is a decreasing continuous
function of the pricing density. The demand of an RDU agent with a concave
diﬀerentiable utility index is a non-increasing continuous function of the pricing
density. Contrary to the EU model, the function changes with the pricing den-
sity. It also depends on the distortion. Furthermore, the intervals of inelasticity
of demand which depend on the price and the distortion are independent of
the initial wealth and of the utility index. Let us emphasize that the demand
remains continuous even if the distortion is discontinuous. When ambiguity is
measured by the index
f
00
f0 , the larger this index and the more likely is demand
to be inelastic.
5 The convex-concave case and the CPT
5.1 Characterization of solutions
Motivated by Prospect Theory, in this section, we extend the characterization
of optimal solutions to the case where L is not necessarily concave with respect





where f is continuous on [0,1], C1 on (0,1), increasing, f(0) = 0, f(1) = 1 and
u is an increasing function, continuous on R+ and of class C1 on R∗
+. We also
assume that there exists x0 > 0 such that u is strictly convex on [0,x0] and
strictly concave on [x0,+∞) and limx→+∞ u(x)/x = 0. We ﬁnally suppose that
the quantile of the pricing density F
−1
ψ is continuous on (0,1) and such that the
assumptions of subsection 3.1 are fulﬁlled, so that the existence of an optimal
solution is guaranteed.
Many generalizations may be considered: general L, general CPT utility
arbitrary number of inﬂexion points. Let us mention that this subsection carries
over to these generalizations and in particular to the general CPT case where
two diﬀerent distortions are used according to whether x is above or below x0.






f0(1 − t)u(x(t))dt :
Z 1
0
q(t)x(t)dt = w (33)
where q(t) := F
−1
ψ (1 − t) and w > 0 is the agent’s wealth. Under our assump-
tions, we have existence of a bounded solution but in general, it is not unique.
Let x be such a solution, then there are three cases:
1. x ≤ x0 on [0,1] and x maximizes J on {x ∈ A :
R 1
0 q(t)x(t)dt = w and x ≤
x0} and J is convex on this subset,
2. x ≥ x0 on [0,1] and x maximizes J on {x ∈ A :
R 1
0 q(t)x(t)dt = w and x ≥
x0} and J is concave on this subset,
3. there is a t0 ∈ (0,1) such that x ≤ x0 on [0,t0] and x > x0 on (t0,1].







f0(1 − t)u(x(t))dt (34)
where A0 = {x : [0,t0] → [0,x0], nondecreasing
R t0
0 qx = w0} and
w0 :=
R t0







f0(1 − t)u(x(t))dt (35)
where A1 = {x : [t0,1] → [x0,+∞), nondecreasing
R 1




The concave problem (35) (or case 2.) can be solved by the techniques and
the optimality conditions of proposition 2. In particular, x is continuous on
{x ≥ x0}. We will therefore focus here on the convex problem (34) (or case 1.).
Let us remark that x0
R t0
0 q ≥ w0 and if x0
R t0
0 q = w0, then A0 = {x0}. We
may thus assume that x0
R t0
0 q > w0.
Let β0 ∈ (0,t0) be deﬁned by the condition
R t0
β0 x0q = w0 and deﬁne
Γ := {(α,β) ∈ R2 : 0 ≤ α ≤ β ≤ β0}.
For (α,β) ∈ Γ let us set:
xα,β := θα,βχ(α,β] + x0χ(β,t0]
where χA denotes the characteristic function of the set A and θα,β is chosen








The family {xα,β} consists of the elements of A0 which only take the values
0, x0 and (possibly) an intermediate one. The next result states that solutions
of (34) belong to this family.











and the set of solutions of (34) consists of the xα,β’s with (α,β) maximizing
J0(xα,β) over Γ.
Proof. Let x ∈ A0, and α, β be such that [0,α] = {x = 0} and [β,t0] = {x =
x0} (β ≤ β0). Since x is nondecreasing we can write
x(t) = x0θ([α,t]), ∀t ∈ [0,β] (38)
























Let us set dµ(α) = x0dθ(α)/θα,β and prove that µ is a probability on [α,β]. It



































xα,β(t)dµ(α), ∀t ∈ [0,t0]
which proves that any element x ∈ A0 can be represented as in (36). Further-







which proves (37). Finally, if x solves (35) and we write x in the form (36) then
since J0 is strictly convex, µ has to be a Dirac mass (otherwise Jensen’s inequal-
ity is strict), hence, µ = δα,β for some (α,β) ∈ Γ that maximizes J0(xα,β).
17The elementary decomposition (36) has its own interest and may be used as
a very simple argument in other contexts (e.g. Neymann-Pearson problems as
in [20]) to avoid the use of Krein-Millman’s type results (which require a priori
some compactness). If we go back to problem (33), we see that its solutions
take at most one value in (0,x0). Furthermore, if {x ∈ (0,x0)} 6= ∅, then x is
discontinuous with at most two jumps (one from 0 to the intermediate value
and one from this value to x0).
Combining propositions 7 and the results for the concave case of section 3.2
suggests the following strategy to solve (33):
• ﬁx (t0,w0) (such that 0 ≤ w0 ≤ w, x0
R t0
0 q ≥ w0 and x0
R 1
t0 q ≤ w − w0),
• for such a (t0,w0) solve the concave problem (35) (it has a unique solution
characterized by conditions similar to those of proposition 2) and the con-
vex problem (34). By proposition 7, this amounts to solving a constrained
two-dimensional optimization program,
• optimize in (t0,w0) the sum of the values of problem (34) and problem
(35).
In the next subsection, we will consider a class of models for which this
strategy enables us to solve (33).
5.2 Application to a class of CPT models





with f ∈ C1([0,1],R+) an increasing distortion and u a C1 increasing function
fulﬁlling u(0) = 0 and there exists x0 > 0 such that u is strictly convex on [0,x0].
We assume without loss of generality that u is the restriction on [x0,+∞) of a
strictly concave C2 function (again denoted u, slightly abusing notations). This
concave extension fulﬁlls the standard conditions u0(0) = ∞ and u0(∞) = 0.
Let I : R → R be the inverse of u0. The function I is decreasing with I(0) = ∞
and I(∞) = 0. Deﬁning as before F
−1
ψ as the quantile of the price (and q(t) :=
F
−1




f0 increasing on [0,1]. (40)
The aim of this section is to solve problem (33) which we refer to as the CPT de-
mand problem, this will involve three technical lemmas proved in the appendix.
Following the approach of the previous paragraph, let (t,w0) with 0 < t < 1







18where A0 = {x : [0,t] → [0,x0], nondecreasing
R t
0 qx = w0}. From proposi-


















and the constraints are: 0 ≤ α ≤ β ≤ t, 0 ≤ θαβ ≤ x0.
Lemma 2 Under (40), then any solution of (P0t) only takes the values 0 and
x0 in [0,x0].
It follows from lemma 2 that the total wealth w is spent only for consump-







f0(1 − s)u(x(s))ds (41)
where A1 = {x : [t,1] → [x0,+∞), nondecreasing
R 1
t qx = w}. The unique
optimal solution of (P1t) is characterized by the following.
Lemma 3 Assume (40), then







, s ≥ t (42)









ds = w (43)
2. or there exists t1 such that the solution of (P1t) is given by (42)-(43) for
t ∈ [t1,1] and for t ≤ t1, one has






, s ≥ t0 (44)














ds = w. (45)
Since λ0 is a decreasing function of w, H(0) is an increasing function of w.
Therefore the larger w and the more likely is the solution to be of type 1. More
precisely, the solution is of type 1, i.e. always above x0, as soon as H(0) ≥ x0





Our last step to solve the CPT demand problem consists in maximizing V .
19Lemma 4 Assume (40), then, using the notations of lemma 3, one has
1. In case 1 of lemma 3, either V is decreasing on [0,1] or there exists t∗
such that V is increasing on [0,t∗] and decreasing on [t∗,1].
2. In case 2 of lemma 3, there exists t∗ > t1 such that V is increasing on
[0,t∗] and decreasing on [t∗,1].





Let us remark that (46) is an optimality condition for the optimal switching point
t∗ (at which there is transition from the convex regime to the concave one). It
follows from lemma 4 that, under (40), the value function V is quasi-concave.
We then have uniqueness of a solution to the CPT demand problem.
Proposition 8 Under (40), the CPT demand problem has a unique solution.














ds = w or the solution equals 0 on [0,t∗] and I(λt∗
q(s)
f0(1−s))




When t∗ > 0, it follows from (46) and the concavity of u that xt∗(t∗) is








x1 or equivalently λt∗
q(t
∗)












and thus t∗ is a decreasing function of w: the larger w and the more likely is the
optimal consumption to be strictly positive. When w becomes suﬃciently large,
t∗ = 0 and the optimal consumption is always above x0, and increases with w.
Comparing these results with those obtained in section 4, we can conclude that
the CPT model allows richer income eﬀects than the concave RDU model.
Remark Let us now mention the case where F
−1
ψ /f0 is decreasing. It follows
from subsection 4.1 that on {x ≥ x0}, the solution is constant. From proposition
7, a solution of the CPT problem is of the form
x = θα,βχ(α,β] + θχ(β,1] (47)
where (θ,θ,α,β) are optimal solutions of the three-dimensional problem
max(θ,θ,α,β) u(θα,β)
R β
α f0(1 − s)ds + u(θ)
R 1
β f0(1 − s)ds
subject to: θα,β
R β
α q + θ
R 1
β q = w, 0 ≤ θα,β ≤ x0 ≤ θ.
Therefore an optimal demand is of the form
X = θχ[0,a](ψ) + θ1χ]a,b](ψ)
with 0 ≤ θ1 ≤ x0 ≤ θ. An optimal demand thus amounts to selling a com-
bination of two digital options on the pricing density and buying the riskless
asset. This result has some similarity with Schied’s result [20]. Contrary to the
previous CPT example, the optimal demand may not be unique.
206 Examples
The ﬁrst example is a concave RDU problem constructed to show that the
demand may have an arbitrary number of constant pieces. The second example
uses a convex-concave distortion as in prospect theory, the third a discontinuous
distortion. Finally, the last example uses a general L. Throughout this section,
it may easily be veriﬁed that all the assumptions of subsection 3.1 are fulﬁlled
except the continuity of the utility up to x = 0 since we consider a logarithmic
utility. Nevertheless, as already noticed in section 3.1, upper-semicontinuity
of L(t,.) is enough for the existence result to hold and this covers the case of
u(x) = ln(x) (extended by −∞ at 0).
6.1 RDU with a continuous distortion
Example 1 We consider a case where the demand has exactly two ﬂat pieces.
In this example, we assume that u(x) = ln(x), F
−1
ψ (t) = q(1 − t) = et and that























The function ˜ xλ that maximizes pointwise the integrand in (48) is given by:
λ˜ xλ(t) :=
f0(1 − t)




Since z0 is not nondecreasing, ˜ xλ cannot solve problem (48). However the shape
of z0 together with the optimality conditions of proposition 2 suggests to look







z0(t1) if t ∈ [0,t1],
z0(t) if t ∈ [t1,t2],
z0(t2) if t ∈ [t2,1].
(49)







f0(1 − s)h(s) − e1−s
ds.
From (22), Λ(1) = 0. If xλ = 1/(λh) is the solution, we must have Λ(t1) =
Λ(t2) = 0 and Λ = 0 on [t1,t2] for a pair t1 ∈ (0,1/2) and t2 ∈ (1/2,1). Hence
1
z0(t1)
[f(1) − f(1 − t1)] = e − e1−t1.
f(1 − t2)
z0(t2)
= e1−t2 − 1
We obtain t1 ≈ 0.339, t2 ≈ 0.672. By construction, h deﬁned by (49) is nonin-
creasing and it can be checked (see graph) that Λ ≥ 0 on [0,1]. The optimality
21conditions for (48) are thus satisﬁed. It ﬁnally remains to determine the multi-








The next ﬁgure represents the graph of the unconstrained solution z0 and
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To illustrate the use of the optimality conditions on this example, we have
also added the graph of Λ/λ. It is immediate to check on those graphs that the
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Example 2 In the previous example, we have considered convex distortions,
but we may as well consider distortions which are neither convex nor concave
as in Prospect Theory. Again we take u(x) = ln(x), we assume that prices are
uniformly distributed on [1,2] so that q(t) = 2−t and we consider the following
distortion
f(t) := t + t(t − 1)(1/2 − t)
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By the same arguments as in the previous examples, we ﬁnd a unique bunch
for x which is of the form [0.45,1]. We have plotted on the same ﬁgure, the
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We now consider a distortion which is concave for small t and convex for t
close to 1
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For such a distortion (and with the same distribution of prices and utility
as before) we ﬁnd a bunch for x of the form [0,0.61], so that the shapes of x, ˜ x
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6.2 RDU with discontinuous distortions
As an example, we study the demand of an ε-contamined RDU with logarithmic
utility index and a power distortion function in the case of uniformly distributed
prices on [1,2] (i.e. Fψ(t) = t−1, q(t) = 2−t). We then have to study ﬁrst for







Denoting by xλ the solution of (50), we recall that xλ = 1/(λhε) for some
nonincreasing function hε independent of λ (when ε = 0, we will simply write
h0 = h). Let us also recall that the demand is given by X(ψ) = x(2 − ψ) =
Cw/hε(2 − ψ) (see Example A of section 4.1) for some constant C > 0.
Our aim is to discuss the dependence of the demand with respect to the
parameters ε ∈ [0,1) and β > 1. The interpretation of those two parameters is
the following: β is a measure of distortion and ε a measure of aversion to the
worst case (or extreme cautiousness).














zε(t) := λ˜ xλ(t) =
(1 − ε)β(1 − t)β−1
(2 − t)
.
An easy computation shows that ˜ xλ is decreasing for every β ≥ 3/2. Hence
hε and xλ are constant in that case. Since Λ(1) = 0, we obtain from (51) that








When β ∈ (1,3/2), we denote by tmax the point where ˜ xλ attains its maxi-










0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
t
The next statement, proved in the appendix, characterizes the form of the
demand according to the values of the parameters ε and β:
Proposition 9 Let β ∈ (1,3/2), the demand is given by X(ψ) = x(2 − ψ)
where:




Cwz0(t) if t ∈ [0,t1],
Cwz0(t1) if t ∈ [t1,1]
for some t1 ∈ [0,tmax] and some C > 0,
2. if ε = 0, then x ≡ 2w
3 if and only if β ≥ 4/3,






Cwzε(t0) if t ∈ [0,t0],
Cwzε(t) if t ∈ [t0,t1]
Cwzε(t1) if t ∈ [t1,1]
for some pair 0 ≤ t0 ≤ t1 ≤ tmax and some C > 0,
4. if ε ∈ (0,1), then x ≡ 2w












The three possible shapes of the demand are represented in the next ﬁgure.
flat case (epsilon or beta large)
epsilon=0 and beta<4/3
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26When ε = 0 and the distortion is high (β ≥ 4/3 in our example), the demand
is totally ﬂat. For small distortion (β < 4/3), the demand is ﬂat only for low
values of the pricing density.
When ε > 0, there is an additional eﬀect due to aversion to the worst case.
For ﬁxed ε > 0, since Φ is nonincreasing in both arguments, there exists β(ε)
such that the demand is constant if and only if β ≥ β(ε). Note that β(0) = 4/3
and β(ε) is nonincreasing in ε. For the demand to be constant, it is enough that
either ε or β is large. When both aversion to the worst state and ambiguity
aversion are small (in the sense β < β(ε)), then the demand is ﬂat only for
low and for high values of the pricing density, in other words, the demand is
strangled. In that case, it should also be noted that ε and β have quite diﬀerent
eﬀects: ε forces the demand to be constant for high prices whereas β induces
constant demand for low prices.
6.3 A class of RLU examples
In this example, we consider an RLU example which is not in the class of
RDU’s: the case where L(t,x) = ln(t+x) and as previously, prices are uniformly







ln(t + x(t))dt :
Z 1
0
qx ≤ w. (54)
As previously this problem admits a unique solution, whose determination






ln(t + x(t))dt − λ
Z 1
0
(2 − t)x(t)dt (55)
and such that the budget constraint is satisﬁed by x. For a given λ the function









Contrary to the RDU case, where it is easy to discuss the monotonicity of ˜ x
independently of the multiplier λ, the situation is more complicated here because
the variations of ˜ xλ depend on λ. The next proposition, proved in the appendix,
characterizes the form of the solution x to (54) depending on the value of the
income w:
Proposition 10 The demand is given by X(ψ) = x(2 − ψ) where the solution
x to (54) is:
• constant equal to 2w/3 when w ≤ 3/(2e3/2 − 2),
• increasing, equal to ˜ xλ with λ = (w + 2/3)−1 when w ≥ 10/3,
• of the form:
x(t) =

˜ xλ(t0) if t ∈ [0,t0],
˜ xλ(t) if t ∈ [t0,1],
for some λ = λ(w) ∈ (1/4,1) and some t0 = t(w) when w ∈ (3/(2e3/2 −
2),10/3).
27We want to emphasize here an important qualitative diﬀerence between the
RLU and RDU models. We have seen in the previous proposition that when the
income is low, the demand is constant. As the income increases, the demand
becomes constant only for high prices. Finally, if w is large, the demand is de-
creasing. In the RDU model, whether the demand is ﬂat or not does not depend
on the income. The RLU model therefore seems to allow richer income eﬀects
than the RDU one. The three possible shapes of the demand are represented in
the next ﬁgure.
decreasing demand (large income)
medium income
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Appendix
Proof of theorem 1
Let (xn) be a maximizing sequence for (10). The budget constraint and the
assumption on q imply that xn is uniformly bounded on [0,1 − δ] for ev-
ery δ ∈ (0,1). It then follows from Helly’s theorem, that up to a subse-
quence, we may assume that (xn) converges pointwise to some nonnegative
and nondecreasing function x. By Fatou’s Lemma, x also satisﬁes the bud-
get constraint and g(xn(0)) converges to g(x(0)). By monotonicity, we also
have L(t,xn(t)) ≤ L(t,y(t)) for every t and n with y the bound deﬁned by
(11). Assumption 3 and Fatou’s lemma (applied to the nonnegative functions







One immediately deduces that x solves (10) (note also that the value of (10) is
ﬁnite thanks to assumption 3).
Let x ∈ L1(q) be a solution of (10) and let us assume by contradiction that x
is not bounded. By the monotonicity of L and g one necessarily has
R 1
0 qx = w.
Let k > 0 and set yk := min(x,k) + αk where αk > 0 is such that yk satisﬁes
the budget constraint with an equality i.e.:
αk =
R




If we prove that v(yk) > v(x) for k large enough, the claim will follow. First we









Assumption 4 and the expression of αk imply that there exists C > 0 such that
Z
{x≤k}
[L(t,x + αk) − L(t,x)] ≥ C
Z
{x>k}
q(x − k). (58)
The monotonicity and concavity of L(t,.) on [x0,+∞) (for x(t) > k) give
Z
{x>k}









With (57) and (58), we thus get
v(xk) − v(x) ≥
Z
{x>k}
(Cq − ∂xL(t,k))(x − k).
By assumption 5, the integrand above is positive for k large enough, which
proves the result.
Proof of proposition 9
Let us recall that x = xλ∗ for some value of the multiplier of the form λ∗ =
1/(Cw) and deﬁne ˜ x = ˜ xλ∗ = Cwzε.
Let us assume ε = 0. If x is given by (52), there is nothing to prove. Let us
then assume that x is not constant. If x(0) < ˜ x(0), then x is constant on [0,1],
a contradiction. Because Λ(0) = 0 and Λ0 < 0 whenever x > ˜ x, necessarily, x
and ˜ x have to coincide on some (maximal) interval [0,t1] with t1 ≤ tmax. On
[t1,1], we have a.e. either ˜ x = x or x0(t) = 0. The ﬁrst case being impossible, x
is constant on [t1,1] which proves the ﬁrst claim.
Let us prove now that the solution is constant if and only if β ≥ 4/3. To
prove this, let us ﬁrst remark that β ≥ 4/3 is equivalent to ˜ x1/w(0) ≥ 2w/3.
Thus, if β < 4/3, the constant (52) is above the graph of ˜ x1/w for small values
of t which implies Λ(t) < 0 for small t > 0. Hence (52) is not optimal in this
case. If β ≥ 4/3, then by construction the constant function given by (52)
satisﬁes the budget constraint and all the optimality conditions of proposition
2 except possibly the nonnegativity of Λ that has to be justiﬁed. Since the
constant (52) is less than ˜ x1/w(0), the equation ˜ x1/w(t) = 2w/3 has a single
root t∗. By construction one has, Λ(0) = Λ(1) = 0, Λ non decreasing on [0,t∗]
and nonincreasing on [t∗,0], hence Λ is everywhere nonnegative which proves
the optimality of (52).
In the case ε > 0, we have Λ(0) = ε/x(0) > 0. If x is constant, then it
is necessarily given by (52). Assume that x is not constant, then for small
t > 0, Λ(t) > 0, hence x(t) = x(0) for t in some maximal interval [0,t0] with
t0 < 1. One necessarily has t0 ≤ tmax, since otherwise one would have x 6= ˜ x
a.e. which would imply that x is constant. From (17), x has to coincide with
29˜ x on some maximal interval [t0,t1] with t1 ≤ tmax. On [t1,tmax], x 6= ˜ x, hence
x is constant. Let t∗ be the upperbound of the interval on which x = x(t1). If
t∗ < 1, then one should have x(t) = ˜ x(t) for t ≥ t∗ close to t∗ which is impossible






˜ x(t0) if t ∈ [0,t0],
˜ x(t) if t ∈ [t0,t1]
˜ x(t1) if t ∈ [t1,1].
Since ˜ x = Cwzε, this proves assertion 3.
Finally, plugging the expression of the constant candidate solution (52) in












Hence condition (53) exactly means that Λ ≥ 0, which is equivalent to the fact
that the constant given by (52) is optimal.
Proof of lemma 2
Let β be ﬁxed and w0 = w0−x0
R t
β q(s)ds. Eliminating θαβ = w0 R β
α q(s)ds, we need
















α f0(1 − s)ds
R β
α q(s)ds
− u(θαβ)f0(1 − α).
Since s →
q(s)
f0(1−s) is decreasing, for any s ∈ [α,β], q(α)f0(1−s) ≥ q(s)f0(1−α),










0(α) ≥ f0(1 − α)(u0(θαβ)θαβ − U(θαβ)) > 0
since θαβ ∈ [0,x0] and u is convex on [0,x0]. Hence the optimal α equals β
proving the desired assertion.
Proof of lemma 3
For a ﬁxed t , let us ﬁrst remove from (P1t), the constraints that x is non-




f0(1 − s)u(x(s))ds s.t.
Z 1
t
qx = w. (59)
30From standard arguments, for any t, the solution of (59) is xt deﬁned by (42)
with λt deﬁned by (43). Since s →
q(s)
f0(1−s) is decreasing, xt is increasing and xt ≥






≥ x0. Since I is diﬀerentiable by





















Hence H is increasing and H(t) → ∞ as t → 1. There are then two cases:






≥ x0 with λ0 deﬁned by (43) for t = 0, then
H(t) ≥ x0 for all t ∈ [0,1) and we are in the case 1,
• or H(0) < x0. From the intermediate value theorem, there exists a unique
t1 such that H(t) ≥ x0 for t ≥ t1. Equivalently, the optimal solution of
(P1t) is (42) for t ≥ t1 with λt deﬁned by (43). For t ≤ t1, (P1t) being addi-





























t0 with t0 deﬁned by (45).
Proof of lemma 4













From (60), we deduce










= f0(1 − t)(−u(xt(t)) + xt(t)u0(xt(t)))
From (60), t → xt(t) = I(λt
q(t)
f0(1−t)) is increasing on [0,1] and x → −u(x) +
u0(x)x is decreasing and tends to −∞ as x → ∞. Hence on [0,1], t →
−u(xt(t)) + xt(t)u0(xt(t)) is decreasing on [0,1] and tends to −∞ as t → 1.
If −u(x0(0)) + x0(0)u0(x0(0)) > 0, from the intermediate value theorem there
exists a unique t∗ such that V 0(t∗) = 0 and V 0 ≥ 0 on [0,t∗] and V 0 ≤ 0 on
[t∗,1]. If −u(x0(0)) + x0(0)u0(x0(0)) ≤ 0, then V is decreasing on [0,1].
Let us now consider case 2. For t < t1, from (44), we have













V 0(t) = −u(x0)f0(1 − t) + u0(x0)x0f0(1 − t0)
q(t)
q(t0)



















As in case 1, on [t1,1], t → −u(xt(t))+xt(t)u0(xt(t)) is decreasing and tends to
−∞ as t → 1. Since −u(xt1(t1)) + xt1(t1)u0(xt1(t1)) = −u(x0) + u0(x0)x0 > 0,
from the intermediate value theorem there exists a unique t∗ such that V 0(t∗) =
0 and V 0 ≥ 0 on [t1,t∗] and V 0 ≤ 0 on [t∗,1].
Proof of proposition 10
For ﬁxed λ, let xλ denote the solution to (55). Elementary computations show
that:
• ﬁrst case: if λ ≤ 1/4, then ˜ xλ is increasing, hence ˜ xλ = xλ,
• second case: if λ ≥ 1, then ˜ xλ is nonincreasing, hence xλ ≡ cλ, cλ a
constant. By the optimality conditions, cλ = (e3λ/2 − 1)−1,
• third case: if λ ∈ (1/4,1), then ˜ xλ is decreasing on [0,tλ] and increasing




λ) if t ∈ [0,t∗
λ],




We know that there is λ > 0 such that x = xλ and
R 1
0 (2 − t)x(t)dt = w.
If λ ≤ 1/4, then the budget constraint
R 1
0 (2 − t)˜ xλ(t)dt = w yields w =
1/λ − 2/3. Hence, we obtain w ≥ 10/3. Conversely, if w ≥ 10/3, deﬁning
λ = (w+2/3)−1, then ˜ xλ solves (55) and satisﬁes the budget constraint so that
x = ˜ xλ.
If λ ≥ 1, then cλ = 2w/3 so that w = 3/(2e3λ/2 − 2) ≤ 3/(2e3/2 − 2).
Conversely if w ≤ 3/(2e3/2 − 2), then the constant 2w/3 solves (55) for λ =
2ln(1 + 2w/3)/3, hence x ≡ 2w/3.
The only remaining case is w ∈ (3/(2e3/2−2),10/3). In that case, λ = λ(w)
necessarily belongs to (1/4,1), hence x is as in the claim. The values of λ(w)
and t(w) are (in theory) determined by the budget constraint and the optimality
conditions.
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